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6 Bad apples, bad barrels and bad
cellars: a “boundaries” perspective
on professional misconduct
daniel muzio, james faulconbridge,
claudia gabbioneta, and royston
greenwood
Parmalat – formerly one of the largest dairy companies in the world –
went bankrupt on December 24, 2003, leaving behind a “hole” of
14 billion euros, a sum almost twice the company’s 2002 sales turn-
over. Subsequent investigations revealed that the company’s financial
accounts had consistently and deliberately been falsified for each of the
thirteen years that Parmalat was listed on the Milan Stock Exchange.
During those years, professionals – who are supposed to act as gate-
keepers (Coffee 2005, 2006) – did not (or, in some cases, decided not
to) seewhat was going on. Deloitte –whichwas auditing the company’s
group accounts – did not raise any concerns until October 2003 when
they issued a disclaimer on the company’s accounts, as they could not
determine the amount of a fund held by a subsidiary. Standard and
Poor’s constantly rated the company at the investment grade and even
improved its outlook only a fewmonths before the company defaulted.
Securities analysts, similarly, remained positive on Parmalat’s shares
until the company was already on the verge of bankruptcy; only a few
days before the fraud was detected, fifty-seven of sixty-six of their
equity research reports recommended buying or holding the company’s
shares.
Enron’s story, one of the biggest scandals in American history, is not
much different, although it took place in the supposedly more devel-
oped US stock market. As in the Parmalat story, professionals did not
effectively perform their ascribed roles. Arthur Andersen, the com-
pany’s auditors, consistently approved Enron’s accounts without rais-
ing any concerns and failed to inform “the company’s audit committee
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about both the accounting policies in use at Enron and the unusual
transactions the company had conducted” (Batson Report 2003:
40–41). Management consultancies such as McKinsey, which advised
Enron, endorsed its strategic repositioning and praised its “asset light”
strategy (Kipping, Kirkpatrick, and Muzio 2006). Not until four days
before bankruptcy was declared on December 2, 2001, did rating
agencies lower their ratings of the company to below the mark of
a safe investment. As late as October in the same year, fifteen securities
analysts rated Enron a “buy” and twelve of them recommended it as
a “strong buy.” Even as late as November 8, when Enron disclosed that
nearly five years of earnings would have to be recalculated, eleven of
fifteen analysts continued to recommend buying the stock. Only three
analysts issued “holds” and one a “strong sell” – even though (admit-
tedly in retrospect) Howard Schilit, an independent analyst, dismis-
sively concluded that “for any analyst to say there were no warning
signs in the public filings, they could not have been reading the same
public filings as I did” (Forbes Report 2003).
The above stories reveal how elite professions and professional
service firms are implicated in some of the world’s most prominent
examples of corporate corruption. Moreover, there is no apparent
slackening of the trend: “If accounting scandals no longer dominate
headlines as they did when Enron and WorldCom imploded in
2001–02, that is not because they have vanished but because they
have become routine” (The Economist 2014: 24). Yet the professions
have historically justified their influence and privileges with reference
to their “gate-keeping” responsibilities (Coffee 2005, 2006), their
commitment to social trusteeship (Brint 1994) and the importance of
their fiduciary role (Thornton, Jones, andKury 2005). There is, in other
words, a “regulative bargain” (Cooper et al. 1988: 8; Freidson 2001)
whereby the state grants the professions a monopoly and self-
regulation in exchange for the commitment to maintain ethical stan-
dards and use their expertise to serve the public interest (MacDonald
1995).
Instances of wrongdoing by any occupation or organization are
cause for concern, but those practised by professions such as law and
accountancy are especially worrisome, for two reasons. First, the orga-
nizational form of the professional service firm is designed to ensure
professional competence and integrity – so its apparent failure requires
understanding. Second, and more profoundly, the professions are
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integral parts of the institutional system of checks and balances which
should prevent corporate corruption of the sort practised by Parmalat
and Enron. As such, the professions play a critical role in the financial
markets because “capitalism cannot function without trust”
(The New York Times 2012). However, as the episodes of corporate
corruption reported above unequivocally indicate, they are, at best,
failing in this gate-keeping role or, at worst, they are actively involved
in the very forms of misconduct that they are responsible for over-
seeing. Instead of being lauded exemplars of ethically driven profes-
sional conduct, “major accountancy firms have become the
unacceptable face of capitalism . . . Scratch the surface of any financial
scandal or a tax dodge and the invisible hand of major accountancy
firms is highly evident” (Mitchell and Sikka 2011: 8).
In this chapter, we analyse the institutional conditions that
increase the likelihood of professional misconduct. We seek to
address the following questions. To what extent are professionals
involved in corporate corruption? Under what circumstances do
professions tend to aid rather than police misconduct? What is the
relationship between professional misconduct and the institutional
context in which professions operate? We define professional mis-
conduct broadly as any behaviours, legal or illegal, that contravene
normative expectations and professional codes of conduct. Under
this definition, law firms advising their clients on how to shelter
their income from taxation, and accounting firms turning a blind
eye to their clients’ accounts, are instances of professional miscon-
duct. In both cases, professionals violate the professional norms that
supposedly regulate their behaviour.
We begin by reviewing three perspectives on professional ethics:
the functionalist perspective that ties professionalism to the public
interest, the conflict perspective that focuses on the self-interested
practices behind professional claims and the ecological perspective
that ties misconduct to the changing relationships and boundaries
between multiple stakeholders. We then frame and elaborate our
analysis against this latter perspective by connecting professional
misconduct to the tensions, risks and conflicts generated by key
institutional boundaries which are increasingly fragmenting profes-
sional practice. These shifting and complex boundaries, we propose,
are generating a range of blind spots, opportunities and temptations
that are contributing to the incidence – and increased risk – of
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professional misconduct. We conclude by suggesting a programme
for future research.
Professions and ethics
The notion that professional occupations are distinguished from reg-
ular businesses and trades by their superior moral fibre is well estab-
lished in the foundational writings in the sociology of the professions
(Carr-Saunders andWilson 1933; Durkheim 1957; Parsons 1954). For
these founding fathers, professions were defined by “an admirable
sense of responsibility” and “a pride in service given rather than by
interest in opportunity for personal profit” (Carr-Saunders andWilson
1933: 471). As a result, professions were seen as civilizing forces that
could act as “stabilising elements in society” and “centres of resistance
to crude forces which threaten steady and peaceful evolution” (Carr-
Saunders andWilson 1933: 497). For Durkheim (1957), the civic sense
of the professions was a part of a system of moral restraints that could
address the anomie of modernity, and for Carr-Saundera and Wilson
(1933), the established professions were even a bastion against the
barbarities of Nazism and Stalinism.
In short, for these and other functionalist writers, the professions
have a normative value that comes from the role they exercise for the
benefit of society, and from the superior ethics, altruism and civic
conscience of their members. Similar assumptions, albeit with less
hagiographic undertones, characterize the ultimately flawed taxo-
nomic project of trait theorists (e.g., Barber 1963; Greenwood 1957;
Millerson 1964), which sought to analytically distinguish professions
from other occupations based on their key empirical attributes.
Professional ethics based upon a public interest orientation were one
of the few traits shared by most checklists.
In these functionalist and trait-based perspectives, professional mis-
conduct is a misnomer that runs counter to the very idea of profession-
alism. Accordingly, this literature does not directly deal with the issue,
but if it could offer an explanation it would probably be in line with the
“bad apple” hypothesis (Kisch-Gephart, Harrison, and Treviño 2010),
whereby misconduct results from the behaviour of rogue individuals
acting against the standards and norms of their profession.
From the 1970s, an alternative and increasingly dominant perspective –
conflict theory (Freidson 1970; Johnson 1972; Larson 1977;MacDonald
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1995) – began to offer a different take on this issue. For these writers,
professionalism is a “peculiar type of occupational control rather than an
expression of the inherent nature of particular occupations” (Johnson
1972: 45). Crucially, it is a form of control that empowers producers
vis-à-vis consumers by entrusting professionals with “occupational dom-
inance” (Freidson 1970) over the performance of their ownwork, includ-
ing its means, ends and the terms and conditions under which it is
performed (Freidson 1970). These outcomes are the result of a conscious
and systematic political project aimed at translating “a scarce set of
cultural and technical resources into a secure and institutionalised system
of social and financial rewards” (Larson 1977: xvii).
Professional ethics to these writers are seen as rhetoric that legit-
imates the privileges of monopoly, self-regulation and higher levels of
income. Not only do professions not have a special moral commitment,
but they also engage in self-serving behaviours. Professional miscon-
duct, in this sense, is consistent with a “bad barrel” hypothesis (Kisch-
Gephart et al. 2010) as it reflects the way that professions are designed
as social systems, that is, how they are structured to prioritize their own
interests over the public good. As George Bernard Shaw put it, the
professions are designed to act as conspiracies against the laity (Shaw
2004).
Both the conflict and functional perspectives view misconduct (or,
in the latter case, the lack of it) as an inherent and defining feature
of professionalism. As such they provide an essentially static
account of misconduct and give little attention to how change
within and between professional occupations may contribute to its
occurrence or form. Particularly important – and so far relatively
ignored – are changes to the institutions of the professions – such as
training and qualification regimes (Freidson 1994, 2001), ethical
codes and disciplinary mechanisms (Brint 1994; Dinovitzer, Gunz,
and Gunz 2015; Greenwood 2007; Reynolds 2000), or forms of
governance (Greenwood and Empson 2003; Lipartito and Miranti
1998; von Nordenflycht 2014) – which, though designed to support
professional standards and constrain the possibility of misconduct,
are increasingly becoming undermined. In this context, in our opi-
nion, a more unfolding, dynamic approach to professional miscon-
duct is needed – an ecological perspective – in which misconduct is
connected to shifting political and economic contexts that are dis-
rupting the traditional institutional arrangements of the professions
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and eroding their ability to support and regulate appropriate pro-
fessional behaviour.
Theoretically, the key idea and our starting point is provided by
Abbott’s notion of professional “ecologies” (1988, 2005) which,
through its emphasis on professional competition, offers a dynamic
view of changing relationships within and between professional occu-
pations. According to this perspective, professions exist as parts of an
interlinked system where they compete against each other to control
specific tasks (Halpern 1992). These tasks are organized as jurisdic-
tions over which professions advance more or less exclusive claims.
However, because jurisdictions confer material advantages, the claim-
ing and retention of jurisdictional boundaries are inevitably a contested
process in which professions advance competing claims in front of key
audiences such as the state, the public and the employing organization
(e.g., Albrecht and Levy 1982; Begun and Lippincott 1987; Goode
1960, 1969; Halpern 1992; Kronus 1976).
In later work, Abbott (2005; for a similar if less developed argument,
see Burrage, Jaraush, and Siegrist 1990) portrays the systems of profes-
sions as part of a broader “linked ecology” with adjacent institutions
such as the state and the universities, reflecting the fact that the pro-
fessionalization projects of specific occupations are constrained, sup-
ported and generally affected by the moves of social actors adjacent to
them and with whom they regularly interact (Muzio, Brock, and
Suddaby 2013; Suddaby and Muzio 2015; Suddaby and Viale 2011).
As Abbott (2005: 247) observes, “[n]ot only does a jurisdictional tactic
like licensing have to succeed in the system of professions, it also has to
succeed in the ecology of the state, for quite other reasons.”
Abbott’s focus on professional ecologies emphasizes the particular
importance of “boundaries” that delineate and regulate professional
jurisdictions by separating rival interests and the claims of different
stakeholders. Based on his work, we identify different types of bound-
aries which are typically in play within professional ecologies: “juris-
dictional” (boundaries between different occupational domains),
“geo-political” (between different national realms) and “ecological”
(between stakeholders such as practitioners, clients and employers).
Importantly, professional ecologies and their boundaries are inherently
unstable because of endogenous struggles within the system of the
professions itself and exogenous developments in adjacent fields.
The redrawing of existing boundaries allows groups to colonize new
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jurisdictions, exploit new opportunities, avoid regulatory constraints
and diminish existing obligations. Professional ecologies, in this sense,
are in constant evolution, especially “on the fringes” where different
sectional claims and interests are more likely to come into conflict.
Indeed, Abbott contrasts relatively stable professional heartlands
with the chaotic and disrupted lives along the frontiers. In his words,
“boundaries are zones of action because they are zones of conflict”
(Abbott 1995: 857).
In this context, professional misconduct arises from the re-drawing
of jurisdictional, geo-political and ecological boundaries within and
between professional ecologies. In particular, changing boundaries
may undermine existing oversight regimes, fuel conflicts of interest,
create regulatory blind-spots and generate opportunities for unortho-
dox, illegitimate and even illegal forms of behaviour. Regulatory,
demographic and technological change, in other words, can undermine
existing professional and regulatory institutions and disrupt estab-
lished jurisdictions and their associated organizational forms and
work practices (Brock, Powell, and Hinings 1999; Leicht and Fennell
1997). In this context, professional misconduct is consistent with a new
“bad cellar” hypothesis, as it arises from the relationships and bound-
aries between different stakeholders (barrels) in a broader ecological
system (cellar). In the rest of this chapter we elaborate how the three
sets of boundaries here identified can contribute to professional
misconduct.
Changing professional boundaries and misconduct
Jurisdictional boundaries
Jurisdictional boundaries are one of the key elements of the “system of
the professions” (Abbott 1988). They identify different professional
domains and assign them specific tasks, competences and obligations
(Abbott 1988; Freidson 1984, 1994). By doing so, they create an order
within the system of professions that, although dynamic and constantly
changing, allows it to function in a rather effective way and to survive
over time (Albrecht and Levy 1982; Begun and Lippincott 1987; Goode
1960, 1969; Halpern 1992; Kronus 1976). Jurisdictional boundaries,
however, may also create opportunities for professional misconduct.
We see two main ways by which this can happen.
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First, professional misconduct can be the consequence of profes-
sionals and professional service firms crossing over different profes-
sional jurisdictions. For example, conflicts of interest may arise when
audit firms offer their clients non-audit services. When this happens, as
highlighted by Levitt (2000), firms may use the audit “as a springboard
tomore lucrative consulting services” by providing only a cursory audit
in the hope that doing so will enhance their relationships with a client.
Or, firmsmay compromise the exercise of professional scepticismwhen
evaluating financial statements in favour of primarily commercial inter-
ests. According to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, audit
firms that offer both audit and consultancy services may eventually
“impair investor confidence in auditor independence and lead to
declining confidence in public capital markets” (SEC 2000).
Similarly, a conflict of interest may arise when law firms provide con-
sulting in addition to legal services (Rosen 2002), or when securities
analysts, who are supposed to produce independent assessments of
a company’s stock, succumb to the pressures exerted by their employer
to issue “more favourable” recommendations (Barber, Lehavy, and
Trueman 2007; Dugar and Nathan 1995; Hayward and Boeker
1998; Lin and McNichols 1998; Michaely and Womack 1999;
O’Brien, McNichols, and Hsiou-Wei 2005).
The idea that professional misconduct can be the consequence of
crossing jurisdictional boundaries is well established (Sikka and
Willmott 1995). Much less attention, however, has been paid to
a second way by which jurisdictional boundaries may lead to profes-
sional misconduct. Reliance upon (rather than the crossing of) jurisdic-
tional boundaries creates the risk of misconduct arising from
“institutional ascription” (Gabbioneta et al. 2013; Gabbioneta,
Prakash, and Greenwood 2014).
Gabbioneta et al. (2013) emphasize that most instances of corporate
corruption involve several professional firms. Accounting, law, con-
sultancy, investment firms and rating agencies are often implicated at
the same time, confirming Palmer’s (2012: 36) suggestion that “most
wrongful courses of action require at least the tacit cooperation of
others and thus are at least nominally collective”. For this reason,
attention should be given to the network of gatekeepers rather than
to dyadic relationships such as those between auditors and clients. It is
in this context that Gabbioneta et al. (2013) introduce the idea of
institutional ascription. They propose that several conditions – the
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jurisdictional division of labour among professionals, the over-
specialization of professional work (Leicht and Fennel 1997) and the
increasing volumes of activity with which professionals and profes-
sional service firms have to cope (Braun 2000) –may push professionals
to uncritically and unduly rely on the work performed by other profes-
sionals and/or professional service firms. It is this passive acceptance of
the work of others that opens up the way for misconduct.
The most obvious example of this pattern of behaviour is the heavy
reliance upon the reports of auditors. In the Parmalat case, professional
reliance was clearly evident, first in the relationships between two
accounting firms and later in the relationships between accounting
firms, analysts and rating agencies. Gabbioneta et al. (2014) show
how Deloitte’s “unconditional opinion” on the company’s group
accounts relied on Grant Thornton’s audit of several of Parmalat’s
subsidiaries, including Bonlat, the group’s “garbage can.” Similarly,
Arnold and Sikka (2001: 483) point out how, in the case of the Bank of
Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), the “appointment of two
auditors limited the scope of each auditor authority and facilitated
BCCI’s financial manipulation.”
Once audit reports are available they are often uncritically accepted by
other professions – even those that are supposed and claim to exercise
independent scrutiny and judgement – because “a green light from an
auditor means that a company’s accounting practices have passed mus-
ter” (New York Times April 13, 2008; in Sikka 2009). Credit rating
agencies, for example, often base their ratings on financial statements
that they assume have been appropriately checked. The Public
Prosecutor in the Parmalat case was especially critical of rating agencies
because they “did not develop a true analysis of the company’s financial
statements,” even though doing so would have shown that these state-
ments “were abundantly false” (Public Prosecutor, Parma). Similarly,
the US Senate Committee investigating the role of rating agencies in the
Enron case decried their behaviour because they “did not perform
a thorough analysis of Enron’s public filings; did not pay appropriate
attention to allegations of financial fraud; and repeatedly took company
officials at their word, without asking probing, specific questions –
despite indications that the company had misled the rating agencies in
the past” (Senate Governmental Affairs Committee 2002: 108).
The chain of reliance on other professionals in the above stories also
implicates securities analysts, who formulated their investment
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recommendations using financial data that they presumed had been
diligently audited and had been appropriately examined by the credit
rating agencies. This reliance occurred despite the proclamation of
analysts that they “exercise independent professional judgment when
conducting investment analysis, making investment recommendations,
taking investment actions, and engaging in other professional activ-
ities” (CFA 2013). As reported in the New York Times (2001), one
analyst “persisted in recommending the (Enron) stock” because he did
not “think accountants and auditors would have allowed total shena-
nigans.” Or, as another securities analyst candidly admitted, “we
actually do something similar to an act of faith . . . if we know that
those who have more information than we do have already expressed
a positive opinion, to some extent we raise our hands . . . and consider
the financial situation as given . . . we do not question . . . [issues] on
which rating agencies have already given their opinion” (Gabbioneta
et al. 2014).
Coming full circle, audit firms frequently rely on the work of law
firms. When asked why Arthur Andersen did not report on Enron’s
suspicious accounting practices, Nancy Temple – in-house attorney for
Arthur Andersen – answered that it was “because Vincent&Elkins had
said there was no problem and that no further action would be neces-
sary.” Marco Verde – one of the auditors working for Parmalat –
testified that he had agreed with the company on the value of
a certain transaction because the law firm assisting the company had
not raised any concerns about it (Court of Milan 2008).
Institutional ascription can arise from several motivations and per-
ceptions. Observers may misunderstand the basis of others’ jurisdic-
tions and attribute a process of diligence and detailed scrutiny that
those professions would not claim. Or, it could arise from professional
failure – as when an auditor fails to detect a wrongdoing within
a client’s organization. Or, it could stem from the inappropriate actions
of a professional (as in the Parmalat case). Whatever the initial cause,
however, the central thrust of the institutional ascription thesis is that
any weakness diffuses and infects a professional network and has an
amplifying effect – as more andmore professions sign off, the less likely
that wrongdoing will be inspected and exposed.
Paradoxically, therefore, the existence of jurisdictional boundaries
may either decrease or increase the possibility of professional miscon-
duct. It may decrease it by preventing the emergence of conflicts of
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interests that would arise from professional service firms crossing
jurisdictional boundaries. Yet, boundaries may increase the risk of
professional misconduct, because of the processes of mutual ascrip-
tions of professional diligence that take place among professionals.
Both possibilities – boundary crossing and boundary respect – it is
worth noting, increase not only the risk of professional misconduct
but also the chances that corruption by clients will occur and remain
undetected.
Geo-political boundaries
While not at the centre of Abbott’s analysis (but see Krause 1996;
MacDonald 1995; Burrage and Torstendahl 1990), professional ecol-
ogies and their regulatory regimes have historically existed within
national (or in some cases regional) contexts. Differences in qualifica-
tion frameworks and codes of practice mean that expectation and
definitions of professional conduct vary across geo-political bound-
aries. In a globalizing world, however, professional work is increas-
ingly conducted across these boundaries, and as such geo-political
boundaries are an increasingly significant risk factor in professional
misconduct (see Faulconbridge and Muzio 2012).
The crossing of geo-political boundaries is reflected in the rise of the
large multinational professional service firm which is increasingly repla-
cing the national partnership as the key organizational arrangement for
elite professional activity (see Cooper et al. 1996; Faulconbridge and
Muzio 2008). The largest multinational law firm Baker and McKenzie
has offices in excess of 40 countries and employs over 10,000 lawyers.
The “Big Four” accountancy firms are some of the most globalized
organizations in the world. PricewaterhouseCoopers, the largest, has
offices in over 150 countries and almost 200,000 employees (Empson
et al. 2015). The transnational scope of these organizations creates three
new risks and opportunities for professional misconduct.
First, as they cross geo-political boundaries, professionals may face
uncertainty over the nature and source of their obligations – Nagel’s
(2007) dilemma of double deontology. Historically, professionals
derived their normative obligations from the specific geo-political jur-
isdictions in which they were based (Krause 1996). However, as
Etherington and Lee (2007: 96–97) sharply illustrate, in an era of
frequent boundary crossing, “we might not be too surprised to find
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an Australian lawyer working in the Brussels office of a New York law
firm on a contract for a Japanese client with a German counterpart,
which is governed by English common law, but in which disputes are to
be referred to the International Chamber of Commerce’s International
Court of Arbitration in Paris.” The result is an ethical conundrum for
professionals and clients caught between national jurisdictions and
their respective deontological rules. Nicolson andWebb (1999) suggest
that such situations of double (or perhaps multiple) deontology lead to
systematic uncertainties and unintentional misconduct as professionals
struggle to understand and reconcile the demands of competing
jurisdictions.
A good example of double deontology relates to Swiss banks and
their US clients (see Broom and Bandel 2014). To prevent money
laundering and tax evasion, in 2010 US authorities demanded that
Swiss banks with branches in the US reveal details of accounts held in
Switzerland by US nationals. This immediately left Swiss professionals
in a situation of double deontology. Complying with the disclosure
request would violate Swiss privacy laws, but not doing so would
violate US laws. The Swiss Secretariat released a statement in 2012
noting that “the implementation of these provisions is generating high
costs and legal uncertainty worldwide” (quoted in Novack 2012).
Ultimately, a special agreement had to be reached that allowed Swiss
privacy laws to be broken. This involved Swiss professionals gaining
consent from clients to break Swiss laws. A related but slightly different
example is provided by Smets, Morris and Greenwood (2012) who
found that German and UK lawyers working in the same firm initially
found it difficult to collaborate on cross-border transactions because
differences in their respective deontological codes made certain actions
illegal in one jurisdiction while legal in the other. Again workarounds
were needed, or what Smets et al. (2012) refer to as “situated improvis-
ing.” Both examples raise questions about the malleability of rules and
standards and, as we demonstrate below, the potential to enable
wrongdoing through forms of arbitrage.
A similar form of risk relates to the trend towards off-shoring (see
Daly and Silver 2006; Sako 2015). In such scenarios, double deontol-
ogy is again a problem because it is not typically evident which set of
ethical standards should apply. Should it be those of the offshore
jurisdiction in which the work is completed, or those of the jurisdiction
of the professional service firm off-shoring the work? Or should it be
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those of the jurisdiction where the client is located? Such uncertainty
led the UK Financial Reporting Council to question whether the off-
shore activities of accountancy firms are sufficiently managed to ensure
adherence to ethical standards (Crump 2013).
A second risk concerns more intentional misconduct. Off-shoring
provides corporations with opportunities to escape the reach of national
regulations and regulators – as illustrated by the case of off-shore finan-
cial centres. These are not a new phenomenon (see, for example, Roberts
1994) and have significant financial implications – Sikka and Hampton
(2005: 327) estimate that in 2001 they cost the US government
$311 billion in tax revenues. Importantly for our purpose, off-shore
centres could not operatewithout the support of professionals, especially
accountants and lawyers and those holding new forms of expertise, such
as asset and wealth managers (see Harrington 2015; Wójcik 2013).
As Palan, Murphy and Chavagneux (2010: 13) observe, it is no coin-
cidence that accountants from the Big Four are found in nearly all off-
shore financial centres and that their client base in these jurisdictions is
almost exclusively comprised of corporations seeking to minimize their
tax liabilities. Indeed, following the collapse of WorldCom, a US Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations revealed that the Big Four
accountancy firms had developed multiple tax “products” designed to
exploit differences across national jurisdictions and had done sowithout
apparent regard for their broader professional and fiduciary obligations
(Sikka andHampton 2005: 333). Similarly, in theUK,KPMGdeveloped
a tax-avoidance scheme which used Jersey as an offshore centre in order
to reduce sales tax liability, a practice since deemed illegal throughout
the EU (Sikka and Hampton 2005: 337). In Australia, lawyers enabled
the movement of the entire James Hardie company off-shore to the
Netherlands in order to minimize potential liabilities arising from the
company’s asbestos-based products (Le Mire 2007). A national outcry
forced the Australian Federal government to step in to top-up the com-
pensation fund available to plaintiffs. In these situations the behaviour of
professionals may not necessarily involve illegal actions, but their advice
can be construed as a form of normative misconduct. As Urry (2014: 44)
notes, “even George Osborne, the Conservative Chancellor of the
Exchequer in the UK, describes ‘aggressive tax avoidance’ as ‘morally
repugnant’.”
Thewider issue relates to the responsibility that professionals hold in
the use and impact of their advice. In many instances, professional
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advice which is legally sound enables and supports wrongdoing by their
clients, implicating professionals in the transgression of normative
standards. After the demise of Lehman Brothers it became clear that
the Repo 105 instrument used to remove liabilities from its balance
sheet and the ultimate cause of the firm’s collapse was adopted as
a result of a legal opinion provided by the London office of
Linklaters. This opinion stated that under English law Lehman’s treat-
ment of Repo 105’s instrument was legal. However, Lehman had
previously been advised that under US law such a use of a Repo 105
instrument would not be permitted. Professionals at Lehman’s had
exploited their firm’s ability to cross geo-political boundaries to seek
a favourable professional opinion elsewhere, in order to circumvent its
own national regulations. Moreover, lawyers at Linklaters failed to
consider how technically sound legal advice might be exploited and
have unintended implications – something perfectly feasible given
Linklaters’ activities as a global law firm in New York City.
As Kershaw and Moorhead (2013: 51) note, the question arises:
“Whether the lawyer giving the true sale opinion perceived, or ought
to have perceived, that providing the opinion was likely to give rise to
a real risk of accounting or securities breaches. Or, to echo Lord
Nicholl’s words set forth above in relation to dishonest assistance, if
they were not so aware, had they deliberately closed their eyes and ears
to this risk?”
Similar questions exist with regard to the role of professional services
firms in facilitating tax avoidance. Burger, Mayer and Bowal (2007:
49) note that clients are often “advised in ‘comfort or opinion letters’
issued by law firms to the effect that the tax shelters are ‘perfectly
legal’,” despite the fact that by exploiting an off-shore jurisdiction the
client is breaking laws in another country in which they operate. Geo-
political boundary crossing, then, raises not only new deontological
uncertainties but generates situations in which professionals can
become implicated in corporate wrongdoing.
The third risk associated with the crossing of geo-political bound-
aries is the lobbying of national governments for regulatory changes
that increase the possibility of misconduct. As Flood (2011: 510)
emphasizes: “the size and scope of global law firms has made them
difficult to encompass within a single regulatory jurisdiction” and “put
them beyond the reach of effective national regulation” (for an
accounting example, see Greenwood and Suddaby 2006). Moreover,
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their scale gives them the ability to pressure national governments for
favourable regulatory treatment.
A clear example was the threat by the Big Four accountancy firms to
relocate to Jersey if the British government failed to introduce “limited
liability partnerships” (Mitchell et al. 2002). The Big Four engaged two
law firms in London (Slaughter &May and Simmons& Simmons) and
one in Jersey (Mourant du Feu & Jeune) to introduce limited liability
partnerships in Jersey. They then used the threat of relocation to
successfully lobby for similar legal arrangements to be introduced in
the UK. The motivation for introducing this new organizational form
was to limit liability in cases involving professional negligence.
In effect, the ability to move across national boundaries was used to
undermine the concept of joint and several liability that has tradition-
ally been portrayed as a fundamental mechanism for reducing the risk
of professional misconduct (Greenwood and Empson 2003; Briscoe
and Von Nordenflycht 2014).
The size and significance of global professional services firms gives
them not only leverage over national regulators but also influence over
the design of international regulatory arrangements. As Flood points
out, “global capitalism has been predicated on the rule of law . . . and
among its chief architects are the large international law firms” (2011:
511, emphasis added). In performing this role, firms accomplish two
things. First, as Suddaby, Cooper and Greenwood (2007: 334 – see
also, Arnold 2005; Faulconbridge and Muzio 2012) note, “the histor-
ical regulatory bargain between professional associations and nation
states is being superseded by a new compact between conglomerate
professional firms and transnational trade organizations.” This new
compact uses the growing size and the power of global professional
service firms, in alliance with international organizations such as the
WTO, to support deregulatory agendas and develop globally inte-
grated markets for professional expertise. Five US law firms, for exam-
ple, formed the backbone of the legal division of the Council of Service
Industries which lobbied hard for the de-regulation of professional
services markets as part of the WTO’s GATS agreement (Terry 2001).
Second, the legitimacy and effectiveness of national regulatory fra-
meworks are being constantly undermined. The global law firm, for
example, has managed “to sideline the inconvenience of conflict of
interest rules while continuing to pay lip service to them” (Flood 2011:
508–509). Caramanis (2002: 400) describes how in the 1990s the then
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“Big Five” accounting firms “co-ordinated or at least initiated” a series
of reforms to the Greek audit profession, which made it easier for them
to employ foreign accountants in Greece. This made the Greek accoun-
tancy profession “gravely concerned as these measures (the new quali-
fication exams [especially]) could call into question its [the Greek
profession’s] standing and reputation” (quoted in Caramanis 2002:
400). Similarly, residency requirements in Canada that “protect(ed)
consumers from malpractice by making disciplinary control more
practicable and by facilitating the ability of injured parties to sue for
negligence” were undermined by WTO free trade regimes (Arnold
2005: 313).
Ecological boundaries: clients, investors and employers
A series of “ecological” boundaries separate and regulate professional
relationships with clients, employers and, increasingly, financial inves-
tors (Abbott 1988, 2005; Burrage et al. 1990). These boundaries
establish professional duties by specifying the rights and obligations
of different parties – such as the duty to avoid conflicts of interest or to
ensure client confidentiality (Dinovitzer et al. 2015). They are also
designed to limit the possibility that professionals may be unduly
influenced such that they fail to observe their own deontological obli-
gations. Three boundaries are especially noteworthy: between profes-
sionals and their clients; between professionals and the organizations in
which they work; and, third, those between professional firms and
investors.
Boundaries between professionals and clients
It used to be thought that clients are less knowledgeable and organized
than their professional advisors and therefore less able to define and
ensure that their interests are appropriately addressed (Johnson 1972).
Yet, in the corporate world at least, clients are becoming increasingly
sophisticated (Sturdy 1997). Furthermore, they are increasingly taking
a more short-term and transactional approach to professional relation-
ships, constantly reviewing their suppliers (Broschak 2015).
The outcome is client capture: “companies tend to select auditors
who will provide a clean opinion as cheaply and quickly as possible.
Similarly, accountants who discover irregularities may be better off
asking management to make minor adjustments, rather than blowing
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the whistle on a mis-statement that could embroil their firm in costly
litigation” (The Economist, December 13, 2014). In this context, audi-
tors have become “dozy watchdogs” (The Economist 2014: 25).
As a result, boundaries originally designed to protect clients acquire
a new significance in protecting professionals themselves (Heinz 1982).
“Client capture” (Dinovitzer, Gunz, and Gunz 2014; Gabbioneta
et al. 2014; Gunz and Gunz 2008; Leicht and Fennel 2001) refers to
situations where advice is tailored to the commercial interests of clients
and weakens the professional’s fiduciary obligations to the broader
public. In other words, the interests of clients are prioritized to the
point where the “social trusteeship” (Brint 1994) responsibilities of
professionals are compromised. Although capture may occur over
relatively mundane issues (Dinovitzer et al. 2014), it particularly mat-
ters where it affects the “gatekeeping” role of the professions – such as
their commitment to the administration of justice or to the accuracy of
financial statements.
The implications of client capture are starkly illustrated by the
involvement of the professions in corporate wrongdoings such as
those committed by Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and Parmalat. In each
case, a professional firm was deflected from behaving “professionally”
either by explicit pressure from the client or by the implicit fear of
losing the client. In the case of Enron, “[Arthur] Andersen team mem-
bers routinely succumbed to demands for certification from Enron
management,” spectacularly failing in their obligations towards third
parties, especially investors (Macey and Sale 2003: 1179). In the legal
profession, to give one example, Australian large law firm Clayton Utz
was complicit in the strategy of its client British American Tobacco to
destroy documentation so as to minimize litigation risks (Cameron
2002; Parker 2004).
Rating agencies have been similarly criticized for their lack of inde-
pendence. As Crotty (2009: 566) observes, “ratings agencies are paid
by the investment banks whose products they rate. Their profits there-
fore depend on whether they keep these banks happy . . . If one agency
gave realistic assessments of the high risk associated with these secu-
rities while others did not, that firmwould see its profit plummet. Thus,
it made sense for investment banks to shop their securities around,
looking for the agency that would give them the highest ratings and it
made sense for agencies to provide excessively optimistic ratings.” Such
a view is echoed by Partnoy (2009: 432), who argues that “credit-rating
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agencies . . . sell not information, but keys that unlock the financial
markets” and that, as a consequence, issuers have strong incentives to
look for the agency that would give them the highest possible rating.
A growing literature seeks to identify the circumstances that increase
the likelihood of client capture – or at least the risk of its occurrence. For
Sharma (1997), who uses the term client control, it is most likely to occur
in situations where clients have alternative providers, where professionals
make significant investments in a particular client relationship and where
there is a high degree of dependency upon a particular client. Macey and
Sale (2003) refer to the size of the client, the dependency of the firm upon
revenues from a particular client and theweakening of collective account-
ability implied by the limited liability partnership format. Klimentchenko
(2009) and Sikka (2009), referring to the relationship between auditing
and consulting, stress the impact of “cross selling” and how this can
compromise fiduciary services.
Several factors are supposed to reduce the risk of client capture. Since
the Sarbanes–Oxley reforms of 2002, the extent of consulting that can
be provided to an audit client has been constrained. Similarly, many
countries worldwide have introduced mandatory audit rotation every
three to five years. But the evidence to date is that these factors are, at
best, only partially effective in reducing the risk of client capture (e.g.,
Abbott, Parker, and Peters 2004; Blouin, Grein, and Roundtree 2007;
Cullinan 2004; DeFond and Francis 2005; Myers, Myers, and Omer
2003; Ribstein 2003).
Boundaries between professionals and employers. A particularly
important ecological boundary, and, again, one that is changing and
that has potential significance for the possibility of misconduct, is that
between the individual and the employing organization. The relation-
ship between professionals and bureaucratic organizations has long
been a concern in the literature and was, initially, considered to be an
area of tension because of the (assumed) inherent conflict between
professional and bureaucratic contexts. It was supposed that profes-
sionals would find it difficult to sustain their professional commitment
(e.g., Goode 1957). However, “this line of reasoning has not been
supported by empirical research. Professionals have actually adapted
well to work in large organizations” (Suddaby and Viale 2011: 423).
Moreover, as noted above, professionals have developed a particular
governance form – the “professional partnership” – which is intended
to underpin and reinforce professional values.
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However, as members of professions have moved from being pri-
marily self-employed or employed in modest-sized firms to become
employees of increasingly large firms, the boundary between the pro-
fessional as a member of a profession and as an organizational
employee has assumed high significance (Ackroyd and Muzio 2007;
Larson 1977; MacDonald 1995). It has long been recognized that
organizational size can undermine – at least to some extent – the
traditional autonomy and discretion provided by collegial profession-
alism and can raise the risk of ethical challenges (Brock et al. 1999;
Cooper et al. 1996; Greenwood and Hinings 1993).
The reason why this particular boundary has worrying consequences
is twofold. Larger firms can unwittingly distance their professionals
from the cultural and normative influence of the broader professional
community. Thus, for example, large English law firms have largely
opted out from national vocational training processes and in conjunc-
tion with commercial providers like BPP University developed their
own in-house training programmes (Faulconbridge and Muzio 2012;
Malhotra, Morris, and Hinings 2006). Through these programmes,
trainees are socialized into the organization’s systems, practices and
values. This distancing process is further facilitated by the development
of increasingly sophisticated identity management techniques designed
to control and align individual subjectivities with organizational prio-
rities (Anderson-Gough, Grey, and Robson 1999, 2000; Cooper and
Robson 2006; Covaleski et al. 1998; Grey 1998). Thus, through “the
use of a bundle of increasingly sophisticated HR practices such as
selective recruitment, in-house training, performance appraisal and
mentoring these firms mould their recruits” to fit in with their values
and priorities (Flood 2011: 510).
The second way by which size and organizational status might
compromise professional norms is that professionals within a large
and prestigious firm are more susceptible to the gentle and often
implicit expectations to do things in a particular way. A firm’s prestige
provides a form of “structural assurance” that its way of doing things is
appropriate (Grey 2003; Wilson et al. 2008; Smets et al. 2012).
Structural assurance, in other words, “is especially apposite in profes-
sional settings because it lowers professional concerns that organiza-
tional practices and expectations are appropriate, even though they
may run counter to institutionalized norms of conduct” (Smets et al.
2012: 897). Crucially, this tends to facilitate misconduct as
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professionals in prestigious firms assume that their objectives are “safe
and fair” (Wilson et al. 2008: 989). Importantly, structural assurance
applies not only to employees but to other stakeholders, such as other
organizations in broader networks of expertise, and to regulators, who
are likely to exercise less scrutiny to large firms (Grey 2003; Smets et al.
2012).
Boundaries with investors. Finally, a recent and still developing
boundary that may represent an increasingly important source of ethi-
cal tensions and dilemmas resides between professionals and outside
investors. Traditionally, professionals have been organized as sole
practitioners or as part of “partnerships,” which merge ownership
with managerial control (Empson and Chapman 2006; Greenwood,
Hinings, and Brown 1990; Greenwood and Empson 2003; Maister
1993; Briscoe and Von Nordenflycht 2014). As such, partners are
jointly and severally liable for each other’s liabilities, a pattern of
responsibility intended to ensure the quality and integrity of profes-
sional work. Joint liability, in other words, at least in theory, should
motivate professionals to monitor each other and therefore safeguard
the interests of clients and the broader public.
A distinctive feature of the partnership format – at least until
recently – has been the prohibition of external investors. There was to
be no internal “representatives” (i.e., proponents) of the commercial
“logic” (Pache and Santos 2010). Instead, the professional logic was to
be ubiquitous and thus nurtured and protected. Yet over the last few
decades (Faulconbridge and Muzio 2009; Greenwood and Empson
2003; Briscoe and Von Nordenflycht 2014) an increasing number of
professional service firms, especially management consultants and
investment banks (Briscoe and Von Nordenflycht 2014), have restruc-
tured themselves as publicly listed corporations – moving away from
and potentially undermining the motivation and value of peer control.
This shift has been proposed as a major reason why, for example,
investment banks became more commercially oriented (Santoro and
Strauss 2013).
Some occupations, notably management consulting, adopted the
professional partnership form because it gave them symbolic legiti-
macy. It made them appear professional because that was the format
associated with the established professions – especially law and
accounting for whom the partnership format was mandatory
(McKenna 2006). Recently, however, some jurisdictions – such as
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New SouthWales in Australia, and England andWales – have allowed
external investment in and ownership of law firms. TwoAustralian law
firms have listed on the stock exchange and expanded through high-
profile acquisitions in the UK (Dowell 2012; Gannage-Stewart 2014;
Briscoe and Von Nordenflycht 2014). The UK law firm Gateley was
floated on the London Stock Exchange on June 8, 2015 (Manning 2015),
soon to be followed by the larger firm IrwinMitchell (TheLawyer 2015).
The move to allow external shareholders is significant because they
represent another key stakeholder within professional ecologies and, as
such, provide another set of relationships and tensions that have to be
managed by professional firms and their professional associations.
As indicated by the quote below, which is taken from the prospectus
of Slater & Gordon, for a publicly listed law firm securing a return on
investments potentially clashes with fiduciary obligations towards
other stakeholders:
Lawyers have a primary duty to the courts and a secondary duty to
their clients. These duties – including the attendant responsibilities such
as client confidentiality and the rules relating to legal professional
privilege – are paramount given the nature of the company’s business
as an incorporated legal practice. There could be circumstances in which
the lawyers of Slater & Gordon are required to act in accordance with
these duties and contrary to other corporate responsibilities and against
the interests of Shareholders and the short-term profitability of the
company (Slater and Gordon 2007).
The fear, hinted in the quote and articulated elsewhere is that the duty
to investors to maximize returns on their investment may compromise
standards (Markle 2014; Parker 2004; Rayne 2014). Firms may come
under pressure to maximize billing from existing clients through
aggressive cross-selling, or to compromise quality in order to boost
their profitability. In effect, the breaching of this boundary may rein-
force the client capture dynamics described above. It is, however, too
early to know how these changes in the ownership boundaries will play
out, but not all observers are pessimistic. Some have argued that out-
side investors could reduce the incidence of misconduct by imposing
higher regulatory standards and tightening internal controls (Fortney
and Gordon 2013; Parker 2004; Parker et al. 2008; Parker, Gordon,
and Mark 2010). Nevertheless, the growing role of investors as an
important stakeholder in professional ecologies and the conflicts of
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interest that this additional complexity may generate represent an
important new source of tensions and, potentially, of misconduct.
Conclusions and future research agenda
Our chapter supports the view that professional misconduct arises
from the transformation of professional institutions rather than being
inherent in the nature of the professions themselves. Our analysis
places particular emphasis on changing relational patterns within
broader professional ecologies. At the heart of our argument is the
importance of boundaries with professional ecologies, as these demark
distinct remits, roles and responsibilities and regulate the competing
claims of different stakeholders. We have identified jurisdictional, geo-
political and ecological boundaries, reviewed changes to them that are
destabilizing professional ecologies, and linked these shifts in, and
pressures upon, boundaries to professional misconduct.
We have proposed that, in some cases, boundaries may simply be too
weak. Clients and employers may too easily override the deontological
obligations and fiduciary duties of individual professionals. Similarly,
within multi-disciplinary firms, boundaries between different profes-
sional groupsmay be too thin and porous to provide an effective barrier
against conflicts of interest and opportunistic behaviour. In this most
obvious of scenarios, boundaries simply fail in their objective to sepa-
rate distinct remits, interests and stakeholders. However, in some
situations the opposite problem arises: boundaries may be too strong.
Boundaries can provide barriers that deprive professionals of the full
picture and cloud their professional judgment. They can create blind
spots and lead to processes of collective myopia. In other situations,
boundaries create uncertainties or dilemmas where existing regulatory
and normative orders are weakened if not suspended. In a globalized
professional services market, the gaze and reach of national regulators
are increasingly compromised. The result is a liminal place character-
ized by ambiguity and increased opportunities for questionable experi-
mentation and entrepreneurial behaviours. Indeed, our analysis
suggests how professional firms may actively exploit the gaps and
inconsistencies between national boundaries on behalf of themselves
and their clients. Thus on the basis of our conceptual framework, we
suggest a “bad cellar” hypothesis that ties misconduct to the contested
and shifting boundaries between different actors in broader ecological
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systems. While the “bad apple” and “bad barrel” hypotheses empha-
sized the role of rogue individuals and flawed organizational designs,
we invite researchers to broaden their focus to consider how miscon-
duct may arise at the next level of analysis, that is, on the boundaries
between actors within linked ecologies.
Future research agenda
Our conceptual framework calls for a programme of empirical work to
measure, elaborate and confirm (or modify) the arguments developed
here. This is particularly true with regard to the relationship between
boundaries and professional misconduct. For instance, to what extent
are recent regulatory changes and developments with professional
ecologies reducing the scope for professional misconduct? Obvious
examples include legislation introduced in the wake of Enron and
Parmalat, such as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in the US, which sought to
re-regulate the relationship between professionals and their advisors
and reinforce jurisdictional boundaries by re-asserting the separation
of auditing from consulting. On the other hand, legislation such as the
Legal Services Act (2007) in England and Wales introduces new stake-
holders (i.e., investors) within professional ecologies and potentially
creates new sources of tensions that have to be managed. These may
lead to increased opportunities for misconduct or help to bring in more
comprehensive ethical infrastructures which help to manage such risks.
In this context, it is very important to ask, how are recent regulatory
reforms affecting professional ecologies? What is their impact on pro-
fessional misconduct? How can new regulatory risks be appropriately
managed? Related to this, there needs to be a further debate on where
professional regulation is best located. Historically, professional occu-
pations have admitted and regulated individual practitioners.
However, following the rise of the large professional services firm,
the emphasis has somewhat shifted towards entity regulation (Flood
2011). Perhaps, on the basis of the analysis developed here, profes-
sional regulation should also take a more ecological view and focus on
the boundaries between different actors and jurisdictions
Connected to this point, we need to better understand what factors
are likely to weaken and compromise existing boundaries. For
instance, is capture more likely to occur within stable long-term rela-
tionships, where there may be a high degree of proximity between
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clients and their advisors, or in transactional relationships, where
professionals are under pressure to retain increasingly mobile clients?
Is the presence of outside investors going to exercise new pressures
towards misconduct or will they bring enhanced regulatory regimes
which may reduce these risks?
We also need more research on the relationship between national
regulatory frameworks and the new transnational regimes which are
emerging, around agreements such as GATS, the EU and NAFTA.
While professional practice is increasingly global and requires
a global oversight, it has historically been regulated at the national
level. Although inevitable, the re-scaling of regulation from the
national to the transnational level may undermine existing arrange-
ments and leave behind a series of “black-holes” where professional
practice can escape proper oversight (Faulconbridge andMuzio 2012).
As such, more research needs to be focused on the relationship between
established national and developing transnational regimes and its likely
impact on the potential for professional misconduct. Which regulatory
powers and competences are best left at the national level and which at
the transnational level? What is required to ensure an adequate dialo-
gue and coordination between different regulatory levels? What is the
best way to regulate global professional services firms?
Finally, more research is required in other than Anglo-Saxon con-
texts. There are significant national variations not only in how profes-
sional ecologies are structured (Burrage and Torstendhal 1990;
Faulconbridge and Muzio 2007) but also in corporate wrongdoing
patterns. Yet these differences have not been adequately explored.
We need to understand how professional ecologies in continental socie-
ties, which are more closely structured around the state and character-
ized by stronger jurisdictional boundaries and tighter levels of
regulation (Paterson, Fink, and Ongus 2003), shape professional pat-
terns of misconduct. Coffee (2006), for example, makes a distinction
between continental models, where cases of corruption often involve
strong block-holders (like Tanzi at Parmalat) transferring resources
from the company to themselves, and Anglo-Saxon contexts, where
fragmented shareholding is associated with wrongdoing by managers
who engage in earnings manipulation in order to inflate the value of
their variable remuneration. Given these differences in context and the
form of wrongdoing with which they are most associated, what is their
link with professional misconduct? There is much we still need to know.
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